Information, Expectations, and Inventory Fluctuations: A Study of Materials Stock on Hand and on Order by Ruth P. Mack
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Information, Expectations, and Inventory Fluctuations: A Study of Materials Stock
on Hand and on Order





Chapter Title: Toward a Theory of Inventory Behavior
Chapter Author: Ruth P. Mack
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1415
Chapter pages in book: (p. 269 - 297)13. Toward a Theory of Inventory Behavior
In urgent need of being written, bit by bit,
is the story of how flows of information take
place, whereof they consist, how they influ-
ence expectations, how they are interpreted
in actions, and how actions affecting income
and product are translated back into informa-
tion and expectations is a story.
IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING ECONOMIC CHANGE
It is, of course, a difficult story even to embark
upon. For this there are several reasons. One
concerns the character of the two worlds and
of their relationship to one another. In a sense
the two are one: information and action are,
like mind and matter, part of the same cor-
pus. Few actions do not rest on information
and are not in turn converted to a "signal."
But in another sense they are part of a con-
tinuum, one end of which is scraps of informa-
tion and the other end of which is a concrete
act. The continuum can stretch, for example,
from an isolated and possibly irrelevant ob-
servation of a sentence in a trade journal to
a response in terms of newly rolled steel sheet
spinning onto its giant spools, or from a nota-
tion in a secret-service file that a cargo ship
was sighted here, not there, to young men
creeping over a beachhead. Dead center be-
tween the two ends of the continuum lies the
command.
The Role of Orders
The command is identical to action if it
is always precisely converted into action. Thus
if new orders, which are in essence pieces of
information, are never canceled and always
delivered precisely as written, they are for all
intents and purposes simply predated acts—
shipments. In actuality, orders are sometimes
canceled, postponed, or delivered late. Never-
theless the correspondence is close enough so
that new orders cannot provide an explana-
tion of shipments. They are too nearly simply
an earlier version of the same thing. This is
the difficulty to which I pointed in Chapter
1 when alluding to the serious deficiencies in
current explanations of stocks in which orders,
or changes in unfilled orders, play such a
powerful causative part. In this book, orders
have been cast partly in the role of effect
rather than cause,since one definition of
stocks includes stock on order. In a sense,
then, a borderline member of the world of
information, outstanding purchase orders, has
been joined to the physical world of action
and things.
The construct belongsfullytoneither
world. To picture output and income flows,
ownership must be cracked apart and stock
on hand alone isolated. To study the flow of
information at a causal level, it is necessary
to go behind the order to see what caused
it. But in spite of these deficiencies, the half-
breed has talents of its own—a power to dis-
play and convey information: On the one
hand, ownership has adifferent speed of270 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
change and process of change than has stock
on hand. On the other hand, it reflects in-
formation and expectations very sensitively
and in a particular sort of way. Both char-
acteristics demand recognition in the theory
of inventory cycles.
As to the speed and process of change, two
different manifestations are important. For
One thing, the fact that orders swiftly embody
intentions means that, particularly for depart-
ment stores, intentions, and thereforethe
theory behind action, are readily visible in
ownership though obscure in stocks. This is
a convenience rather than a new ingredient.
But the order, and its inherent fluidity, con-
dition the characteristics of vertical linkages
in the economy. If only shipments or stocks
are examined, the transmission of fluctuation
associated with sales-linked stock objectives
ought,it would seem,to move backward
through the economy with sequential antici-
patory leads and increasing amplitudes of
fluctuation. But if we concentrate on flows
of information instead, notably orders, the re-
tailers' buying and producers' buying of raw
materials can be linked with the speed of
light, or at worst the time required for three
telephonecalls. The previous chapter ex-
panded briefly on this point. It explains, I
believe, a phenomenon that has troubled stu-
dents for many years—the fact that though the
logic of the acceleration principle calls for
progressive acceleration (in timing as well as
volume) as demand moves stepwise to earlier
stages, empirical evidence fails to show it.'
The second attribute of ownership or out-
standing materials orders, that of reflecting
information and experience very sensitively,
involves not so much the particular stock con-
struct as it does a way of viewing the entire
problem of procurement. It elevates the world
of information to a place in the analysis
1Inlecture notes written thirty or forty years ago,
Wesley C. Mitchell lingered over this problem. He
explained itvery tentatively in terms of inventory
objectives conceived as fairly broad bands rather than
as precise ratios. Many subsequent students have ig-
nored the problem.
where it cannot for one moment be forgotten.
At the microeconomic level, emphasis on
information means that, on the one hand, the
notion of process is analyzed in terms of the
information that the businessman uses and
the expectations that he formulates. In the
case of the procurement process, this empha-
sizes the part that expectations about mar-
ket conditions can play in the timing of buy-
ing.It emphasizes possible changes in op-
portunity costs, including qualitative changes
in customers' requirements. It emphasizes and
particularizes the informational role of new
sales orders.
But at a macroeconomic level, too, the em-
phasis on information and expectations has
interesting implications which I want to de-
velop. One reason for trying to think through
some of these implications is a negative one:
the speed with which information in general,
and orders in particular, travel undercuts the
basic assumption of "period analysis" as a
complete explanationofinventorycycles.
"The only indispensable assumption in the
theory of the inventory cycle is that business-
men do not immediately adapt their produc-
tion plan to a change in sales." 2Butinsofar
as orders constitute the adjustment, it can be
virtually immediate. Moreover, insofar as ex-
pectations about conditions are the
reason for the adjustment, it is not unlikely
that many people would want to adjust in
the same way at very nearly the same time.
If so, the inventory cycle could undergo a
series of explosions or, if there were ceilings
to response, a sawtooth rattle. There must be
some way to explain the fact that time series
do not show either peculiarity.
An Ecological Process
Accordingly, it may be useful to reflect on
the patterns of interaction between informa-
tion and action and what these interactions
2LloydMetzler, "Factors Governing the Length of
Inventory Cycles," Review of Economics and Statis-
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imply about the course of economic change.
Biology has a word forit:"Ecology" con-
cerns "...therelations between living or-
ganisms and their environment."The focus
seems directly applicable to economics when
living organisms are restricted to man, and
environment to the portion (largely though
not exclusively economic) which influences
economic behavior.
The way has been prepared for studies of
the ecology of economic processes by the work
of Herbert Simon. He has developed the
notion that though man is "intendedly ra-
tional" in the sense attributed to Economic
Man, the best that can actually be achieved
is"satisfying," not "maximizing" or even
"optimizing," behavior. Divergence from op-
timization is caused in part by shortcomings
of available information and man's capacity
to manipulate it. This implies that satisfying
is at best slovenly optimizing fraught with un-
certainty. But two characteristics are more
fundamental in their implications:(1)Per-
ception is necessarily selective; we appreciate,
perceive, and even see not a total situation
but the part of it for which we are in some
sense ready. (2) That which is deemed "satis-
factory," and which serves consequently as a
proximate goal, changes as events prove the
goal accessible or If these two
simple notions are taken seriously, and they
are founded on widely held psychological
ideas, the course of aggregate economic change
will typically follow a different course from
that implied by "optimizing" behavior.
The point of view demands an analysis that
attends to the way in which a man sees, ap-
preciates and thinks (on the basis of the in-
formation accessible to him) and the way a
3Webster'sNew World Dictonary of the American
Language, CoBege Edition,1959.
4Mostof Herbert Simon's voluminous writings deal
with these ideas at some level. But if a single reference
isdesired,I recommend Chapter 14 in Models of
Man, Social and Rational, New York, 1957, "A Be-
havioral Model of Rational Choice." The article was
reprintedfromQuarterlyJournalofEconomics,
February 1955.
man acts (given his appreciations, expecta-
tions, customs, and what he wishes to achieve).
Moving to an aggregative level, the analysis
must attend to how the thinking and the act-
ing of many men influence that of one an-
other. Finally, at the aggregate level, the cross-
influence must be encompassed: the influence
ofthinking on acting and ofacting on
thought, that is, on information and expecta-
tions, and particularly the assurance with
which expectations are entertained. The sim-
plest way to spell out these ideas is in terms
of a model in which information and expec-
tations, along with actual economic condi-
tions, play their appropriate parts.
Note what these objectives and conceptions
imply about the essential character of an ag-
gregative model: it must be constructed out
of pieces that display the behavior of individ-
uals creating and responding to a Situation
which involves the behavior of other individ-
uals in an economic environment. Man is a
social animal; he is affected in his thinking,
feeling, and acting by his perceptions of the
thinking, feeling, and acting of other men.
If an acting-reacting sequence gets under way,
there is no reason at all to assume that in-
dividuals will react to the situation and to
one another in a fashion that can be de-
scribed in terms of linear aggregate behavior.
Indeed, there is every reason to expect some
sort of geometry of interaction, and it may
"explode"or approachceilings.However,
there is no possible way to prejudge the par-
ticular aggregate function that will be found
to apply, even if it were mathematically fea-
sible to use it. The point is simply that the
coefficientsofresponse and feedback can
themselves change as time goes on. How they
will change can only be evaluated by con-
structing the social process in microanalytic
terms. Happily, this is a job that computers
are very able and willing to take on.
Not only the logic of information systems
but also the empirical studies of previous
chapters seem to present puzzles that invite
a better explanation than the aggregative ap-272 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
proach readily affords. Chief among these is
the phenomenon of thrust. Why does owner-
ship of materials, for department store re-
tailers as well as for durable goods manu-
facturers, appear, at an aggregate level,to
build up abruptly as contraction ends and to
exhibit the curious pattern of a uniform rate
of change which abruptly ceases though other
things continue to climb? A second minor
puzzle is the character of the timing associa-
tion between changes in sensitive prices and
stocks or ownership; though a relationship
seems present, ownership moves too late to
be motivated primarily by anticipation of the
rate of change in prices.
These empirical puzzles are joined by a
theoretical one: The importance of expecta-
tions in governing the timing of buying and
the speed with which information can be
conveyed and responded to in terms of orders
seem capable of causing abrupt spurts in
buying followed by an equally abrupt plum-
met to a hand-to-mouth position. But the time
series show gradual build ups and declines.
Why? The models outlined in Chapter 11 left
this question unanswered.
Clearly an explanation must focus on those
parts of the inventory-purchase complex most
sensitive to changing expectations. Since we
need to supply a missing piece of the com-
pound process of inventory fluctuation, it will
be useful to use the device of a model.
It concerns the influence of market pros-
pects. But it will be useful to focus on only one
aspect of all the factors that influence positive
or negative buying associated with actual or
expected changes in market condition—de-
livery conditions, assortments, quality, materi-
als prices. Only the last, materials prices (other
things the same), will be examined. This is
not by any means the most influential of the
group; delivery conditions are doubtless the
most important single factor. But expectations
about prices have some expositional advan-
tages. As a matter of fact, some of the other
elements slip in too, in spite of stern efforts
to exclude them.
AN ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF PRICE-TIMED BUYING
Price-timed buying can be a positive or a nega-
tive quantity. It is the increment or decrement
to materials orders consequent to the fact that
materials prices are, or have recently been,
expected to change.It concerns primarily
when, in view of expected change in prices,
materials will be purchased which are in any
event expected to be required. If we assume
as a first approximation that the flow of goods
intoproduction(or,forretailers,goods
shippedto consumers)isnotaffected by
price-timed buying, then cumulated price-
timedbuyingisprice-timedownership.
Viewed the other way round, price-timed buy-
ing effectuates desired changes in price-timed
ownership.
From the point of view of a purchaser, the
more price-timed ownership that can be kept
on order (rather than on hand), the better,
assuming that the price is fixed at the time
orders are placed and that there is no doubt
whether goods will be delivered on
Materials on hand involve financing, insur-
ance, and storage costs of which materials on
order are free. However, uncertainty about
delivery schedules may make it desirable to
take delivery on some anticipatory purchases.
In any event, delivery schedules seldom give
perfect expression tothe ideal separation
of buying and shipments. For both reasons,
5 Prices are not always fixed at the time the order
is written. Steel producers have typically set prices at
the time of shipment. (A break in the ranks by Wheel-
ing Steel was reported in The New York Times of
November 4, 1965.) Some products of the fats and oils
industry have been priced in a similar way. These
stipulations on the part of the seller force the buyer
to, in effect, pay the full costs (storage, insurance, full
risk, financing) for any price.timed buying he may
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stocks on hand will usually reflect some price-
timed buying, often of an earlier date. Should
the larger (or smaller) stocks no longer be
desired, a compensating adjustment of new
buying can adjust total price-timed ownership
approximately to the level appropriate to the
present situation. It is reasonable, therefore,
to assume that the impact of price-timed buy-
ing is represented by changes in ownership
without specifying which part of ownership—
the part on hand or on order—is involved.
The model is built from three sorts of com-
ponents: (1) structural characteristics of the
industry and its member firms, (2) behavioral
characteristics that define how actions result-
ing in price-timed buying are generated and
governed, (8) market responses in terms of
prices, delivery periods, and levels of plant
and resource utilization. The only lags or leads
that are admitted are those which seem to
represent the time actually required for speci-
fied processes to take place.
Structural Assumptions
Two sorts of differences are resident in the
structure of a firm and of an industry with
respect to the potential advantage of price-
timed buying. First, within any firm, potential
advantage from further buying is a function
of the level to which price-timed ownership
has previously been extended. Second, the
various firms in an industry differ with respect
to their interest in—that is, in their proclivity
to gain from—price-timed buying.
POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
PRICE-TIMED BUYING
That differences of both sorts are embedded
in the normal structure of business situations
can be seen by a moment's attention to the
potential costs and benefits associated with
price-timed buying. The benefit of price-timed
buying is paying less for materials; the costs
are those of carrying additional goods. It is
advantageoustoundertakepositiveprice-
timed buying so long as the expected increase
in prices per unit, discounted for uncertainty,
during a specified period of time is greater
than the additions to carrying costs over the
same period, other things the same. The dis-
cussion early in Chapter 10 spelled out the
arithmetic of this statement. It implies that
the level of price-timed ownership is a func-
tion of the expected rate of change in prices,
discounted for uncertainty, other things the
same.
In Chapter 10 this discussion is part of an
analysis of other factors that bear on market-
oriented buying and they imply that other
things are not likely to remain the same. In-
deed, in uncertain situations many changes
tend to support one another. Thus an ex-
pectedincreaseinreplenishmentperiod
makes it advantageous to do price-timed buy-
ing on the basis of an expectation of a given
price change which isless sure than would
otherwise be required to justify it. The same
remark applies to a change in back orders;
if finished goods are sold at a price that is
based on present costs of materials, the sale
can be "covered" by materials purchases with-
out many of the risks that would normally
attend price-timed buying.6 These thoughts
re-emphasize the artificiality of a model that
focuses on only one part of a process which
necessarilymovesasa whole.Sincethis
thought is a constant irritant, let me then
enter this blanket demurrer and cease bother-
ing the reader by something that ceaselessly
bothers me. Actually, as I indicate later, the
model could be changed without much diffi-
culty to cover the entire phenomenon of mar-
ket-orientedpurchasing.However,itcan
best be constructed in the first instance with
the focus on price alone.
Optimum ownership associated with expec-
6 It may be allegedthat the normal procedure
should be to cover, and that the notion of price-timed
buying ought to apply to the failure to cover. Perhaps.
But the critical point is that if prices were confidently
expected to decline (and there was no problem about
getting the materials later), a purchasing agent would
not cover.274 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
tations of change in prices is the point at
which the following marginal equality is at-
tained:
Per cent price change per
Price-timed ownershipmonth per unit
in terms of months =
ofexpected salesPer cent marginal carry-
ing costs per month per
unit
In actuality, the price change in the formula
is of necessity the expected change and it is,
in effect, discounted for uncertainty. Carrying
costs which. have previously been discussed in-
clude storage, insurance, financing, physical
depreciation, and obsolescence. The formula
states that if, for example, the price of some
material was confidently expected to rise 3 per
cent per month, and carrying costs were con-
fidently estimated at 18 per cent of selling
price a year or 11/2percent per month, it
would be worthwhile to extend ownership by
a two months' supply relative to the owner-
ship appropriate to stationary buying prices.
As long as the expected rate of rise in
prices (adjusted for uncertainty) remains the
same, no further price-timed ownership (and
consequently no price-timed buying) is war-
ranted. If the expected rate declines price-
timed buying turns negative as ownership de-
clines. If the rise in prices is expected to ac-
celerate further, the level of price-timed own-
ership would presumably increase. However,
this statement is qualified by the first assump-
tion, below.
Of course expectations about prices, or any-
thingelse,arevirtuallyneversure.Ac-
cordingly, the right-hand side of the equation
is reduced by an uncertainty discount. This
means that price-timed ownership is always
less than would be appropriate to sure ex-
pectations. An increase in assurance concern-
ing an expected rate of rise in prices would,
then, operate in about the same way as an
increase in the expected rate of rise, as de-
scribed in the previous paragraph. Conversely,
increasing assurance about falls is equivalent
to a faster drop, other things the same.
ASSUMPTION: INCREASING COST OF OWNERSHIP
As the number of weeks covered by advance
purchases increases, the carrying costs of stock
increase,atfirstgradually and eventually
abruptly. I state this in the form of an as-
sumption, though there is some empirical evi-
dence to support
The possibilityof physicaldepreciation
may sometimes increase with increasing own-
ership, but the major reason for the escala-
tion is the risk of obsolescence. The longer
ahead that requirements must be forecast, the
more time there is for anticipated events to
prove the forecast wrong. This is especially
so in a seasonal business when an advance
position crosses the months of a seasonal peak.
For one thing, at the seasonal peak, advance
positions cover sales for a big month rather
than for a normal one. For another thing,
many aspects of demand may be relatively
stable within a season and changeable be-
tween seasons. The seasonal peaks therefore
will often mark the point of rapidly increasing
risk, which constitutes a virtual ceiling to ad-
vance commitments.
A second escalation of risk involves a guess
about price itself. The longer the advance
commitment, the longer prices must continue
to behave at least in the anticipated fashion
ifthe purchase isto be justified. Though
errors are subject to correction by secondary
negative or positive buying, it may not be
feasible for the correction to be complete.
ASSUMPTION: HILL-SHAPED DISTRIBUTION
OF PROCLIVITY TO GAIN
The potential advantage in shifting owner-
ship position in line with expectations about
materials prices will differ for various mate-
rials that an enterprise purchases and for the
same materialsindifferententerprises.I
would like to refer to the degree of potential
advantage as the "proclivity to gain from
See Franco Modigliani and F. E. Hohn, "Produc-
tion Planning over Time and the Nature of the Ex-
pectation and Planning Horizon," Econometrica, Janu-
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price-timed buying." As mentioned atthe
close of Chapter 2, differences in sensitivity
to any factor that influences stocks is a logical
necessity if the advantage to be derived from
stocks is a function of many costs and benefits
ofspecific kinds. Though businesses share
broad characteristics, they do not share precise
cost structures in the sense of identical relative
importance of various sorts of costs and bene-
fits. These things depend on the particulars
of management talents, customers' needs and
expectations, financial resources, plant and
production setup, and so on. However, it will
be useful to enlarge on the specifics of these
implications of the earlier analysis. What then
determines the proclivity to gain from price-
timed buying?
Proclivity will be affected by the potential
gross gain from a correct guess about prices,
the potential cost of carrying stocks, and the
interest of management in the guessing game
itself. In other words, it will be affected by
any influence on the numerator or denomina-
tor of the equation of a few pages back, and
by, in effect, the subjective utility of the cal-
culation. Without attempting to be compre-
hensive, some of the more important charac-
teristics falling in each of the three categories
follow.
A high proclivity is associated with the size
of the impact on profits of likely changes in
prices. This depends on several business char-
acteristics, other things the same.
1.Volatile buying prices. If prices change
very little, a correct forecast can result at
best in only small advantage.
2. Low value-added relative to the cost of
materials. The impact on profits of guess-
ing right about a given change in buying
prices is greater when materials prices re-
present a large portion, and value-added
a correspondingly small portion, of the
value of the product.
3. Cost of information. If few rather than
many materials are used, it becomes more
worthwhile to spend time studying the
probable course of prices. Other factors
that influence the relative cost of informa-
tion are also relevant.
4. A high turnover of working capital. Prof-
itability is a function of the relation of
earnings to capital and is therefore re-
flected in capital-earnings ratios. There-
fore the significance of a given earnings-
sales ratio depends on the relation of sales
to capitalization. A high turnover of work-
ing capital will tend to emphasize the
significance of buying at the right price,
other things the same.
5. Relation of selling pricestomaterials
prices. If selling prices are set for a sub-
stantial period of time, the producer may
have a period of option as to when mate-
rials are bought. This is an invitation to
consider the probable changes in prices.
A rather different situation, which can
likewise intensify the need for advance
buying, is that in which selling prices are
highly competitive and likely to reflect the
successful anticipation of changes in ma-
terials prices on the part of a few impor-
tant competitors.
6. Other opportunities to outdo competitors'
efficiency. Sure ways of effective competi-
tion are likely to be more popular than
unsure ways, and in some industries, and
particularly for some businesses, efficiency
in factory or sales management provides
a strong competitive tool. When this tool
is weak, recourse to the more risky one
of price-timed buying becomes more es-
sential to effective competition.
A high proclivity is inversely associated with
the impact of carrying charges, and this de-
pends on:
7. The possibility of stipulating when goods
are to be received independently of when
they are ordered. When this can be done
with confidence, the cost of price-timed
ownershipisreduced by confiningit
largely to stock on order.
8. Low carrying costs. Insofar as price an-
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changes in stocks, low carrying costs re-
duce the impact of such changes.
9. Predictable requirements which reduce the
risk of obsolescence. Obsolescence can take
the form of goods that cannot be used at
all, used only after a write-down, or used
inefficiently. Durable raw materials, many
simple processed materials, or standard
basic goods not subject to fickle demand
are relatively resistant to these dangers.
The presence of firm sales orders also
tends to eliminate thisadditional risk
for other sorts of materials.
A high proclivity adheres also to particular
sorts of management structure and talent:
10. Personnel. Good judgment about price
change requires that people able to make
such judgments are available and author-
ized to make them. This requires a man-
agement structure that recognizes, pro-
vides, and rewards this type of talent. Top
management talent tends to be located
in purchasing operations where the factors
previously mentioned contribute to a high
proclivity to gain.
11. Management philosophy. The personality
and sentiment of top management can be
sympathetic or resistant to price-timed buy-
ing to which a "speculative" onus may be
attached.
The proclivity to benefit from price-timed
buying is a net result of all appropriate at-
tributes in their business setting. Proclivities
will differ by type of material and in firms
characterized by different management prob-
lems and structure. Thus a given proclivity
can be assigned to an enterprise-commodity
unit.
The frequency distribution of the proclivity
to benefit from price-timed buying will de-
pend on the joint frequency distribution of
all of the attributes that make for a high (or
low) proclivity. What shape is the distribution
likely to have?
Consider any one of the attributes making
for a relatively high proclivity to gain from
price-timed buying. Some commodities in some
firms in a given industry will be rich in the
attribute; other commodities in the same firm
or in other firms in the same industry will
be poor in it; but the very rich and the very
poor will usually be infrequent compared with
those possessing it in moderation.
For example, materials costs can be high
relative to value added (item 2 above). Thus
the cost of leather for a manufacturer of
popular-priced men's shoes is likely to con-
stitutea large proportion of value added,
because manufacturing operations are highly
mechanized and efficiently managed. At the
other end of the frequency distribution, a
manufacturer of high-priced women's shoes
will find materials costs buried under the
very large cost of many hand operations and
elaborate distribution techniques. In between
(consider calf leathers only) 8liethe bulk of
companies, with more men's shoe manufactur-
ers at the high-proclivity end and women's
shoe manufacturers at the low-proclivity end,
and a substantial overlap somewhere in the
central portion of the range where frequencies
are high.
An analogous type of distribution would
apply to other of the characteristics listed.
Thus, a low risk of obsolescence of purchased
sole and brown side leather, featured in popu-
lar priced men's shoes, would imply a high
proclivity (item 9 above); the multifinished
leathers characteristic of many Sorts of wom-
en's shoes would place such firms at the low
end of the distribution. Again, it seems reason-
ableto expect some humping around the
central area of the array.
If we think of each enterprise-commodity
unit as having a rank position from one to ten
for each characteristic, then the unit's pro-
clivity rating would be some sort of a weighted
sum of the several ratings for each character-
SCalfand cattle hide might be considered part of
the same commodity group, whereas kid and other
leathers are excluded as having quite different con-
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istic. The weights would represent relative
importance of the characteristic in the net
proclivity to gain.
Just what these distributions would look
like for a given industry cannot be determined
a priori. Certainly there are fewer enterprise
commodity units with extremely high pro-
clivities than with moderate ones. At some
point, as proclivity ratings decline, it seems
likely that the number having a given rating
would typically drop off. The distribution
would not besymmetrical, however, but
skewed toward the low proclivity end. Critical
to my argument is the basic wedge shape and
the further thought that it would at least
flatten. Actually it seems likely to me that
it would usually decline at the low-proclivity
end of the array. It seems safe to assume that
these minimal requirements would be met.
In other words, for the purpose of this
analysis we must abandon the notion of the
"representative firm" and think instead of the
hill-shaped firm, or industry, or group of in-
dustries, or economy. The representative situ-
ation is precisely not a median or some sort
of average condition but the basic character
of the distribution of conditions.
STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTIONS AND PRICE-TIMED
OWNERSHIP
The essence of the two assumptions is shown
in Figure 4. The top figure portrays the as-
sumption of increasing costs and shows how,
as increasing rates of change in materials prices
are expected, and guesses are held with in-
creasing assurance, the amount of price-timed
ownership increases and reaches a ceiling be-
yond which there tends to be no inducement
to adventure further. The lower figure shows
the hill-shaped frequency distribution of enter-
price-commodity units in an industry. Con.
cerning the shape of the distribution, I can
only say that, pending empirical study, it seems
to me to be a reasonable one.
The implication of the two structural as-
sumptions can be displayed first under the
highly artificial assumption that expectations
about prices are held with certainty and that
there also is no uncertainty about sales or
anything else capable of influencing expected
costs or benefits from price-timed buying. Un-
der these circumstances the level of ownership
associated with expectations of higher and
higher rates of change in prices would in-
crease without limit and the ceilings of Figure
4 would not apply. A tabular example will
illustrate the point.
Exhibit 3 assumes that the proclivities for
one hundred different enterprise-commodity
units range from a maximum rating of A to
a minimum rating of E: the distribution of
enterprise-commodity units among firmsis,
from A to E, 4, 22, 40, 28, 6, as shown in
the top line of each of the first five columns.
FIGURZ 4
Potential Gain from Price-Timed Ownership
Ceilingsto P-T Ownership
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EXHIBIT 3










A B C D E
1/2 4 4 4
1 8 22 30 26
11/2 12 44 40 96 66
2 16 66 80 28 190 94
21/2 20 88 120 56 6 290 100
3 24 110 160 84 12 390 100
31/2 28 132 200 112 18 490 100
Assume further that an expected rise of the
basic raw-material price of one-half of 1 per
cent per month makes it worthwhile for the
A group to undertake price-timed ownership
sufficient to cover requirements for the sales
of an additional month; for this an extra ton
of materials per enterprise-commodity unit is
needed. A rise of1per cent causes the B
group to extend its ownership by a month's
supply. But at that rate of price increase, the
A group would extend its buying for an ad-
ditional month. In each case one ton of ma-
terials is involved.
As, for each group, prices reach the rate
that justifies some price-timed ownership, the
amount appears in the first line of each col-
umn. But at each successive rate of rise in
prices, enterprise-commodity units for which
some price-timed ownership had been justi-
fied at the previous rate now should extend
their position further. The appropriate levels
of ownership are shown in the sequential
lines for each column, that is, for each pro-
clivity group. Aggregate ownership at each
rate of price change is the sum for the five
groups shown in the next-to-last column.
Additionstoprice-timedownershipare
achieved by means of price-timed buying. This
buying can be thought of as of two sorts:
"initial price-timed buying," which lifts price-
timed ownership from zero to the first positive
figure—the difference between zero and the
first lines in each column; "secondary price-
timed buying," which lifts ownership to fur-
ther levels appropriate to faster rates of price
increase—the difference between all other lines
in the table. Total price-timed buying is the
sum of primary and secondary buying. It is
shown in the last column of the table under
the particular assumption that prices acceler-
ated in the fashion represented by these-
quential lines of the table. But of course this
sequence is only one of the many patterns of
change which could take place. In general
price-timed buying simply effectuates the dii.
ference between the ownership appropriate to
the present expected rate of change in prices
and that appropriate to the previously ex-
pectedrateof change.Consequently,the
amount of price-timed buying ata given
time depends upon the actual course of the
change in prices.
This description has made a totally Un-
realistc assumption about the absence of un-
certainty. Actually, uncertainty causes exten-
sion of ownership to involve increasing costs13. TOWARD A THEORY OF INVENTORY BEHAVIOR 279
EXHIBIT 4




0wnership at Each Rateof PriceRise
Buying at Sequential
Rates of . All
in Price ProclivityGroup Groups Price Rise
A B C D E
1/2 4.0 4.0 4.0
1 7.622.0 29.6 25.6
11/2 10.441.8 40.0 92.2 62.6
2 12.457.276.028.0 173.6 81.4
2 1/2 13.668.2104.053.2 6.0 245.0 71.4
3 13.674.8124.072.811.4 296.6 51.6
3 1/2 13.674.8136.086.815.6 326.8 30.2
4 13.674.8136.096.218.6 339.2 12.4
4 1/2 13.674.8136.096.220.4 341.0 1.8
5 13.674.8136.096.220.4 341.0 0
and decreasing benefits in line with the two
structural assumptions.
To illustrate, suppose that each repetition
of secondary buying for a proclivity group is
associated with cutting the addition to price-
timed ownership under certainty by first 10 per
cent and then 20 per cent of the units—30 per
cent the second time. By the third time 50
per cent is lost, and 70 per cent the fourth
time. By the fifth time the ceiling has been
reached for all. In Exhibit 4 the figures of
Exhibit 3are changed in accordance with
this principle.° Now aggregate ownership itself
ceases to rise after the bottom proclivity group
has reached its ownership ceilings. If prices
had changed in accordance with successive
9Forexample, in column A, price-timed ownership
under certainty, Exhibit 3, increases by four tons as
the expected rate of price rise increases as shown in
successivelines.Under uncertainty, Exhibit4, we
assume that four tons is cut by 10 per cent for the
firstround of secondary buying;thus price-timed
ownership is 4 + .90 x 47.6. In the second round
of secondary buying the increment of four is cut by
30 per cent, thus price-timed ownership is 7.6 + .70 x
4 =10.4,etc.
lines of the table, price-timed buying would
be zero at that point(last column). How-
ever, it would have started to decline long
before, when the decreases in secondary buy-
ing started to be larger than the increases
in primary buying.
The exhibit illustrates the implications of
realistic structural assumptions under entirely
artificial behavioral assumptions. The latter
must now be replaced by more sensible ones.
Behavioral Assumptions
The behavior on which attention centers is
price-timed buying. By definition, it occurs in
association with a change in price-timed owner-
ship.
The amount of price-timed ownership that
a firm wishes to hold depends in the first
place on its position with respect to the two
structural assumptions:(1) the current level
of ownership—the lower the level relative to
the ceiling levels, the less strong need reasons
be to activate a specified amount of owner-280 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
ship;(2) the proclivity to gain from price-
timed ownership—the higher the proclivity,
the less strong need reasons be to activate a
specified amount of ownership.
TWO LAGS
Administrative Response Lags. The placing
of an order requires that an authorized pur-
chaser make a telephone call, confirmed by
an airmail letter. Authorization for routine
purchases is not likely to be administratively
cumbersome. It is ordinarily delegated in ad-
vance to some appropriate person. Authoriza-
tion for further purchases associated with price
expectations may be required to go through
channels, but, in view of the presence of some
leeway in most budgets, it may not actually
need to wait upon confirmation. In general,
then, the response lag to an increase in price-
timed ownership is negligible. (Contrast this
with the lag appropriate to purchases of du-
rable capital goods.) Decreases in ownership,
on the other hand, may require somewhat
longer before negative price-timed buying can
reduce ownership to the desired level. The
maximum rate of reduction, even if there is
no new buying at all, is the current volume of
sales, item by item.
Learning Lag. Changes in price-timed own-
ership occur as a response to learning, and
learning is a time consuming process. Informa-
tion must be collected and inspected; it must
be attended to in the sense of entering the
field of perception;it must be appreciated
and evaluated in terms of appropriate ac-
tion.
All of these things take time and therefore
give rise to a "learning lag." However, with
one exception, the lag for price-timed buying
is probably not long. The evidence bearing
on the probable course of prices and on
changes in business costs or competitors' be-
havior is swiftly come by. Appreciation and
evaluation tend to focus on the purchasing
agent's office and thus do not involve cumber-
some interpersonal procedures. The excep-
tiontothe potentially short learning lag
lies in the process whereby assurance develops.
This involves what may be thought of as a
depth dimension for each of the components
of learning mentioned in the previous para-
graph, with particular emphasis on the last
group. My point is that uncertainty must af-
fect the learning process as well as being re-
flected in a final evaluation such as I discuss
in the next two sections. Insofar as it does
affect the learning process,it will tend to
draw it out.
PRICE EXPECTATIONS AND CHANGES IN COSTS
The reason for and focus of price-timed
buying is, of course, a belief about the future
course of prices. The basic character of a
belief about prices can be interpreted as a
series of possible rates of change with likeli-
hoods associated with each hypothetical oc-
currence. The complete array can be expressed
in terms of an average value. Statistical de-
cision theory formulates the average, the "ex-
pected value," as the average of all possible
values weighted by their subjectively assigned
probability of occurrence. But there are a num-
ber of other methods of selecting a central
value.10 Actually, most people probably deal
with the future without any such mental gym-
nastics.Perhaps they consider,as Shackle
has claimed, only two values, "focus gain"
and "focus loss."" Perhaps they make a best
guess and think also about how likely it is
to turn out right. Perhaps the best guess takes
10 For a classic formulation of statistical decision,
see L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New
York,1954. An excellent short summary of other
decision rules is given in Irwin D. Bross, Design for
Decision, New York, 1953, pp. 102—117.
11 The notion is presented in Expectation in Eco-
nomics, by G. L. S. Shackle, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1952.
An excellent short statement by Shackle appears in
Uncertainty and Business Decisions, edited by C. F.
Carter, G. P. Meredith, and G. L. S. Shackle, 2nd ed.,
Liverpool,1957,pp.94—104;seealsoG.Patrick
Meredith, pp. 38—41, and the frontispiece, the three-
dimensional diagram of the "model of the Shackle
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the form simply of "Will prices rise, fall, or
do neither?" No doubt different people think
in different ways and even at different times.
The advantage associated with price-timed
ownership also depends on carrying costs.
Thus the amount that is undertaken will be
influenced by changes which affect these costs.
Previous chapters have pointed to the impact
of the volume of back orders or de facto
financing costs. What competitors are doing
likewise influences the need to take a posi-
tion. For one thing, it is often thought im-
portant to "buy along with the trade," since
it is more dangerous to be short if competitors
are long in supplies and less dangerous to take
a long position (expecting prices to rise)if
competitors also are long.
ASS URANCE
We have been speaking of expectations
about changes in prices and costs. Expecta-
tions are hardly ever single-valued. An ex-
pected event may happen or not happen;
more usually it may happen in one of many
ways. Assume, to illustrate, that "expectations"
take the form of a probability distribution.
Thus, a purchasing agent may believe, ex-
plicitly or subconsciously, that there are 2
chances out of 10 that prices will fall, 3 that
they will stay the same, and 5 that they will
rise. Accordingly he believes, with some lack
of conviction, that prices will rise. His assur-
ance in this expectation would increase were
his probability weights to shift to, say,1, 2
and 7. He wOuld feel more justified in buy-
ing more materials ahead when the distribu-
tion of weights has humped in this fashion
than when it was flatter.
Or consider an involving more
specific expectations. Suppose thata pur-
chaser thinks that five values percentage
change in prices are possible—minus1,0,
plus .5, plus 1, plus 2. Say that if he feels
relatively sure about hisevaluations,they
carry for him the probability ratios of .05, .10,
.70, .10, .05, respectively. Then the "expected
value" is plus .5 per cent change.12 But if he
feels unsure, the probability ratios might be
more like .40, 0,.20, 0,.40. The "expected
value" is still plus .5, but the utility of price-
timed buying, and therefore the amount that
will be undertaken, islikely to have been
reduced by the consciousness that there are
four chances out of ten that the price will
go down, not up.
However, it would seem that assurance, and
consequently the action to which the opinion
gives rise, can also increase as a result of
changes of a somewhat different sort. Since
these further processes are likely to have a
significant bearing on how assurance waxes
and wanes in an interrelated market, I want
to describe them. Unfortunately, the matter
has not been much explored and is contro-
versial, and therefore the argument must be
developed at some length. However, it is en-
tirely possible to follow the model I present
by interpreting change in assurance in the
conventional fashion, simply as flattening or
humping of a probability distribution—and
skipping or rejecting the argument concerning
"assurance" which follows. It concerns four
additional ways in which the impact of assur-
ance can be conceptualized.
First thereis what William Feilner has
called "slanting," or Donald Ellsberg "am-
biguity."The notion postulates that, feeling
12 The calculation of expected value (e.v.) is:
Expected price Sum
than ge,
per cent —1.00+.5+1.0 +2.0
Probability
weights .05 .10.70.10 .051.0
Prices, weighted
(line I x 2) —.05 0+.35 +.10+.10 +.5
13 William Feliner, "Distortion of Subjective Proba-
bilities as a Reaction to Uncertainty," Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics) November 1961, pp. 670—690, and
Donald Ellsberg in the same volume. Feilner describes
the correction factor for uncertainty in these terms,
"Instead of postulating that individuals maximize the
mathematical expectation of utility itis, at least for
some processes, based on psychological weights that
are in the nature of distorted probabilities" (p. 676).
He has developed this basic idea in a recent book,282 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
unsure of the evidence, perhaps even of the
relevance of the evidence, the decision maker
is aware that his opinion is poorly founded
and unstable. This sort of feeling is not en-
tirely captured in a flattening in a prob-
ability distribution for it also involves a fuzzi-
ness about the whole matter. Presumably, he
will put fewer chips on a fuzzy and, admit-
tedly, potentially unsound judgment than on
a better one.
A second way of thinking about the im-
pact of assurance on action is based on the
psychology of perception. People do not sim-
ply know something or not know it. Nor do
they believe things the first time they hear
them; if they did, life would be allcrisis.
Perception is a process which develops slowly.
Ideas burrow into the "psychological field."
As they burrow, they must in a sense pass
tests of harmony with other information. They
gain significance and the power to throw
their weight around and influence actions.
So conceived, increased assurance is a form
of a more advanced degree of perception.
A third way of thinking about the capacity
of price expectations to influence behavior
is to let oneself slip off the polished back of
the ceteris paribus notion. Actually, as I con-
tinue to complain, it is exceedingly difficult
to cling rigorously to this basic method of
Probability and Profit, Homewood, III.,1965. Donald
Ellsberg discusses "ambiguity" and takesit into ac-
count as a discount for uncertainty in the form of an
index. He points out thatactions may frequently
favor "those definable" as "status quo" or "present
behavior" since for these the degree of confidence may
be high and the range of probabilities narrow.
Price theory has long introduced the notion of a
discount for uncertainty. Oscar Lange described it as
"effective expected prices." "This is the most probable
price minus the risk premium. For sellersthe risk
premium is positive, for buyers it is negative" (p. 31).
OscarLange,PriceFlexibilityandEmployment,
Bloomington, md.,1944.Thesenotionscouldbe
interpreted as simply resulting from the introduction
of a probability distribution rather than asingle-
valued expectation. However, the fact that the direc-
tion of discount is different for buyers than for sellers
tends to bring the ideas into closer relation to the
slanting or ambiguity notion discussed in the previous
paragraph.
scientific thought ina context where the
causal process under examination necessarily
links changes in independent variables in the
system with changes in some of the elements
confined withinthisceteris pan bus com-
pound. In the context of price-timed buying,
it is most unusual for prices to change with-
out corresponding changes in quality, deliv-
eryperiods,andthelike.Indeed,such
changes can readily be converted to a price
dimension. Changes in these other market
phenomena are sure to influence the subjec-
tive assignment of weight to possible price
changes. They will, in other words, affect the
assurance with which the price guess is made.
Finally, "expected values" or "best guesses"
are often poor summaries for a probability
distribution of expected values in the context
of price-timed buying. They fail to take ac-
count of the differential utility of each pos-
sible price. The weighting system equates the
utilitiestothe amount ofpricechange,
whereas actually they are often asymmetrical.
Failure to anticipate a price rise means that
goods have been bought at too high a price.
But price-timedbuying when pricesfall
means not only that the goods are bought
at too high a price but also, in many cases,
that less than optimal articles were purchased.
In effect, then, the denominator of the right-
hand side of the equation is, for price-timed
ownership, inversely correlated with the nu-
merator; risk of obsolescence (in the denom-
inator) ought not to be set down at its aver-
age value but at values specifically related
to specific values of the numerator, the ex-
pected rate of change in price. A further asym-
metry in the utility of positive and negative
error may occur at a personal level. If prices
fall,a purchasing agent may be subject to
criticism for advance buying to which he will
not be subject for "missing the boat" if prices
rise. Virtue's veil clothes the indiscretion of
the resistant gambler but the mistaken gam-
bler is fully exposed.
I conclude that whether one thinks of the
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as influenced by "slanting," the process of
perception, inevitably associated market phe-
nomena, or asymmetry of rewards and penal-
ties, conclusions about behavior are the same;
a best guess about price change will be as-
sociated with varying amounts of price-timed
ownership as assurance or confidence in it,
variously defined, grows or wanes.
The Ownership Surface
These behavioral characteristics prescribe
that the levels of ownership implied by the
structural assumptions must be viewed in
the light of uncertainty about price expecta-
tions. The levels appropriate to sure price
expectations, as illustrated in Exhibit 4, be-
come the limits which would be appropriate
as assurance builds up. They are shown along
the back wall of an ownership surface in
Figure 5.
Actually, price expectations are typically
more or less unsure. Moreover, the structural
as wellas behavioral characteristics imply
that many other aspects of the judgment of
net advantage are also more or less unsure—
those concerning future sales and various ele-
ments of holding costs. These judgments and
those about prices are interrelated. On any
or all of these counts, then, low assurance
reduces the amount of price-timed owner-
ship undertaken at each expected rate of
price change. Assurance is lowest at the front
wall of the surface.
The diagram should be thought of as rep-
resenting potential ownership for a major
material, a commodity, in an industry. Thus
the CC'BB' rectangle represents zero price-
timed ownership. Only such stocks asare
needed for servicing sales and similar matters
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above the plane and negative ownership be-
low it. If no price change is expected (center
of the plane along the lines 00'), there is, of
course, no P-T ownership. The rate at which
prices are expected to rise are shown to the
right, and to fall, to the left of the 00' line.
The higher the expected rate of increase, the
more enterprise-commodity units may be in-
volved in positive ownership, and the larger
the extent of their involvement. That is, the
surface rises as it moves to the right because
of both additional units starting primary
buying and continued secondary buying.
When the expected rate of rise is very low
and also uncertain (front wall just to the
right of 0), no P-T ownership is indicated
even for firms having a very high proclivity to
benefit from price-timed buying. As we move
to the right, the diagram suggests increasing
rates of rise. But actually, it is doubtful that
an expected rate has much meaning when
opinion is very unsure. There are perhaps
a series of overlapping probability distribu-
tions that are all so flat that their meaning
is little more than "prices will probably rise";
how much they are expected to rise is hard
to say except that at the right itis more
than toward the center. That is why the sur-
face is relatively flat at the front wall.
The backward dimension of the diagram
depicts increasing assurance. It portrays the
gradual accretion of price-timed ownership
associated with more enterpriseunitsfor
which additions to ownership appear justi-
fied, and more ownership for each partici-
pant. As depicted, the backward dimension
accounts for much of the rise in price-trend
ownership. This implies that decisions con-
cerning desired ownership are stronglyaf-
fected by degrees of belief. The previous dis-
cussion has attributed the impact of assurance
to the changes in the shape of the probability
distribution of possible prices, and to the fur-
ther forms that increased confidence can take.
The form of a more "advanced degree of per-
ception" seems to assume particular impor-.
tance as one thinks of the competition for
executive attention among the wide variety of
things that, minute by minute, take place in
a business.
Negative price-timed ownershipisare-
sponse to an expected fall in price. It is il-
lustrated in the left lower section of the dia-
gram. The structure is highly conjectural, but
is based on the supposition that the minimum
true hand-to-mouth position which would pre-
sumably be appropriate if serious price de-
cline is expected is much nearer the normal
efficiency levelsfor ownership than isthe
maximum extended position. For this reason
the surface never falls much below —150 (back
left corner), though it rises by over +300 (back
right corner). Also, the difference between
behavior under uncertainty and under cer-
tainty is less extreme.
Positive price-timed buying occurs when
an enterprise-commodity unit wishes to move
from a lower to a higher level of price-timed
ownership, or from a larger to a smaller nega-
tive level of ownership. It occurs, in other
words, when there is a wish to move upward
on the ownership surface. A downward move-
ment involves negative price-timed buying.
Does this buying itself influence the markets
in which it takesplace?
Market Response
The analysis of market response needs to
be formulated largely in terms of price-timed
buying rather than ownership. Price-timed
buying constitutes an addition to, and nega-
tive price-timed buying a subtraction from,
such buying as would occur for other than
price-oriented reasons. The greater or smaller
buying influencesdemand-supplyrelation-
ships; it generates other sorts of behavior in
the contacts of buyers and sellers;itinflu-
ences the information that is generated in
the market place. It therefore influences ex-
pectations about how prices will change in
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sumptions about the character of the several
market responses, and these need to be speci-
fied.
Market responses are of three sorts. None of
the responses are immediate. They all take
time, and how much time is a function of
the things that need to occur. The several
responses, each involving characteristic lags,
concern market behavior, information and
expectations, and income generation.
MARKET BEHAVIOR AND THE MARKET-BEHAVIOR
LAG
Market behavior affects price, market con-
ditions and levels of utilization.
Price Effect. Materials prices tend to respond
to price-timed buying and the strength of the
response is a function of the amount of buy-
ing, other things the same. Diagrammatically,
positive price-timed buying represents a short-
term shift of a demand schedule upward and
to the right. Supply schedules may also shift
upward and to the left as suppliers respond
to the eagerness of buyers and perhaps also
to some short-term rigidities in their own
productionscheduling.Negativebuying
causes shifts in the opposite direction. Thus,
in terms of the usual demand-supply-price
diagrams, aflockof small new short-term
schedules for demand and supply are born
and intersect at higher levels of the vertical
price plane.
Effect on Other Market Conditions. Other
conditions in materials markets also respond
to the extra demand caused by price-timed
buying. The amount of the response depends
in part on the amount of the buying and on
its rate of change. Thus the speed and re-
liability of deliveries may deteriorate simply
because of short-term resistance to changing
the level of output. This means that when
once output has achieved a new level, the
resistance will subside.
The charactermarket responses has two
interesting implications. First, it seems clear
that at this level it is not possible to isolate
the impact of price-timed buying from that
of all other market influences. Second, the lag
associated with these aspects of market be-
havior could be very short indeed. Its length
would depend largely on the institutions of
purchase and sale. The action-reaction pat-
tern of an open market are almost immediate.
For individually negotiated deals, substantial
time may be required before additional sell-
ing or buying is reflected in market condi-
tions, including prices. Seasonal factors can
be important. Sometimes itis conventional
for prices to be changed only at certain times
during the year, and a growing tendency for
prices to rise or fall must wait for the ap-
propriate months. If prices are going to be
raised when the line is announced, some cus-
tomers may be given an opportunity to stock
up earlier at the old prices; this underscores
the periodic influence. The annual trade as-
sociation meetings may be the battleground
for a campaign to change prices.
The Level of Utilization. All these market
responses will tend to be more severe when
the level of utilization is high than when it
is low. This observation implies a further
interdependency of factors affecting owner-
ship. Market responses to price-timed buying
or to buying associated with other market
expectations cannot be disentangled from re-
sponses to the broader picture of supply-and-
demand conditions. If so, lags may be intro-
duced which can be far longer than any
thus far considered. They involvecyclical
rhythms of intensification of the shorter mar-
ket-oriented responses.
EXPECIATIONS MULTIPLIER AND THE EVIDENCE
LAG
Market responses carry information which
is used by prospective buyers and sellers as
a basis of judging the future course of prices.
Consequently, the responses have potential
multiplier effects via their role as evidence
and the power of information to influence
expectations.286 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Here again, the process takes time and
therefore operates with a lag. Open-market
prices are widely displayed daily if not faster.
On the other hand, individual contracts be-
tween producers and buyers are often secretly
negotiated, and the information may be slow
to leak out, if indeed it ever does. The amount
of buying being done by market leaders, the
condition of inventories and order books of
customers and of competitors, all constitute
information which may take days if not weeks
to become generally known.
However the point that I want to empha-
size is simply that the actions listed as market
behavior all convey information. This infor-
mation, after it has had time to disseminate,
influences expectations the next time around.
The "feedback" thus consists not only of mar-
ket actions and consequent changes in de-
mand-supply relations but also of informa-
tion which, along with behavior, influences
further expectations with multiplier effects.
INCOME MULTIPLIER AND THE INCOME LAG
When price-timed buying causes output to
be different from what it otherwise would
be, the resultant income flows are subject to
the usual multiplier effects. Because the situ-
ation can change rapidly, payroll and other
adjustable income flows are doubtless prima-
rily involved. Also, the short-term level of the
propensity to consume, which, of course, varies
widely, will affect the extent that positive or
negative price-oriented demand is amplified.
Expectations may also come into play to aug-
ment or mute the income multiplier effect.
The lags associated with income multipliers
have been widely discussed in the literature.
The Process of Change
The gadgetry of the model of price-timed
buying has now been described in terms of
a group of structural, behavioral, and market
characteristics which interactafterseveral
short delays.
Aggregate change results from the shifting
weights to be assigned to situations described
in Figure 5. The weights indicate the number
of enterprise-commodity units whose price-
timed ownership is at some particular place
in the ownership surface and about to shift
to some other place. The shifts take the form
of positive or negative price-timed buying
—movements upward or downward respec-
tively in the vertical dimension. Systematic
shifts in the pattern of weights will occur as
a result of forces set in motion by an initial
dose of price-timed buying and the business
environment in which it takes place. What
is the pattern through time of the resultant
buying?
It would be satisfying to be able to answer
this question by a process table that spelled
Out the action, feedback, decision, action pat-
tern; but the possibility of this tidy demon-
stration is barred by the basic construction.
The result of the aggregate level is contingent
on the character of the distribution within
the aggregate of proclivity, impulse, feedback
sets. Moreover, it is proper to stipulate these
occurrences only in terms of probabilities, not
as things that will happen. The magnitude of
response will therefore depend on how se-
quences unfold. If so, the aggregate of oc-
currences this month has no prescribed single
relationshiptoselected present conditions
and the aggregate of occurrences last month
or the month before.
Nevertheless, though statements must re-
main qualitative, reasonable and realistic as-
sumptions about objectives, information, pro-
cedures, choices, and reactions seem to lead
to the conclusion that, inherently, a spaced
wave of price-timed buying will be generated
unless intercepted by elements external to the
model. Specifically:(1) cumulation is grad-
ual and progressive—more buying is touched
off per month as the situation matures than
when it is young; (2) cumulation takes time;
(3) reversal is inherent.
I want to discuss the processes of cumula-
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external to the model. Needless to say, they
are present and important, especially in con-
nection with the process of expansion.
CUMULATING EXPANSION
The course of a wave in price-timed buying
of materials can be interpreted in terms of
how and why enterprise-commodityunits
move from one position on the diagram to
another. Start at a point where there is no
longer a general belief that prices will fall
and accordingly the desire for negative price-
timed ownership has abated. This implies that
positive price-timed buying has moved many
firms from the lower left quadrant of the
ownership surface to somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of the origin, zero in Figure 5. I see
no reason why price-timed buying in isolation
could not cease at this point at which owner-
ship tends to be at efficient levels, assuming
that prices would remain stable. But I would
like to suppose that there have been signs
of renewed demand and other healthy under-
pinnings that lead to optimistic expectations.
Some firms in the industry, then, expect
rises in prices, others declines. Most are un-
sure. There now occurs a moderate desire for
price-timed ownership on the part of some
firms with a high proclivity to gain. Price-
timed buying would be governed by the dif-
ference between the previous and present
ownership objective of the participating units.
Assume, now, that nothing from the out-
side occurs to counteract the effects of this
initial dose of price-timed buying. Then mar-
ket responses theoretically bring about a feed-
back: in minute quantities they would con-
sist of behavior responses, expectation and
evidence responses, and even an income mul-
tiplier.
However it seems clear that in reality there
must be some threshold level below which
feedback effects do not develop. How the
threshold should be defined and how it oper-
ates need to be studied. It seems likely that
the rate of change in final demand will be
one part of the story; the sensitivity of in-
formation systems and vulnerability to com-
petitive behavior will be another.
The initial dose, and the feedback effects,
can influence expectations in four ways, and
actions in one further way: (1) fewer enter-
prise-commodity units will be subject to the
expectation of falling prices; (2) more firms
may expect a rise in prices of more materials;
(3) the expected rate of increase may rise,
though this may well tend to be a later mani-
festation; (4) expectations will gain in sure-
ness. In terms of Figure 5, concentration of
situations moves to the right and especially
back. Price-timed buying is positive and there
is more of it than at the time of the original
dose.
As time goes on, there isa fifth way in
which the situation matures. It involves the
objective facts with which firms are faced; the
need for defensive action increases. For ex-
ample, competitors may be amassing low-
priced inventories or suppliers working over-
time. Consequently, the action based on a
given set of expectations, held with a given
degree of assurance, increases. Diagrammati-
cally, the surface as a whole rises. The further
buying will have its own round of feedback
and multiplier effects, which in turn have
further influences on new expectations.
All this takes time. It takes time for busi-
nessmen to perceive developments and learn
their implications. The growth of assurance
isparticularly deliberate, sinceit waits on
successive confirmations of expectations and
events that deepen perceptions. After deci-
sionsareformed,administrative response,
though swift,is not instantaneous. It takes
time for market conditions, including prices,
to reflect the impact of new buying. It takes
time for the evidence to be displayed, per-
ceived, and learned to the extent necessary
to influence new expectations and the assur-
ance with which they are held.
Will a snowballing process get under way,
or will countervailing forces prevail? Counter-
vailing forces internally generated consist of
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hump of the frequency distribution of pro-
clivities has been passed;(2) reduction in
secondary buying because many unitsap-
proach the long end of their long-short market
range;(3)negative(orzero)price-timed
buying to correct ownership based on dis-
appointed expectations about price change.
Numbers 1 and 2 will not generally occur at
the early stage of movement having the basic
time-consuming characteristics that I have de-
scribed. Number 3,disappointed expecta-
tions, is quite another matter, for its preva-
lence depends on whether the stimulation to
prices associated with price-timed buying is
large enough to cause prices to increase as
much as or more than expected. Is this likely
to occur?
The answer hinges, I think, on whether ad-
ditional buying is contingent primarily on
the expectation that the price rise will ac-
celerate (movement to the right of the dia-
gram), or on the increasing assurance that
prices will continue to rise (movement in
the backward If the former gov-
erns, the situation is self-reinforcing only so
long as expectation-activated buying (along
with its ramifying effects) has a large enough
impact on pricesto validate the expecta-
tion. This implies that the price riseisat
least seen to accelerate—a stringent require-
ment unlikely to be met. Moreover, the time
series showed that market-oriented ownership
did not parallel the rate of change in prices
(nor did change in ownership, hypothetically
buying, parallel the change in the rate of
change).
But this hypersensitivity is not likely to
be present if the growth of assurance were
the chief determinant. Assurance would in-
creaseas expectations are repeatedly con-
firmed. If expectations attended primarily to
the direction of change in prices, confirma-
tion consists of continued change in the same
direction. The time series showed the implied
association between market-oriented owner-
ship and prices proper (or change in owner-
ship and change in prices).
The process, then, compounds in the five
ways previously mentioned and desired own-
ership moves backward and somewhat to the
right over the surface of the diagram. Feed-
back mechanisms provide a sixth mechanism
which, along with the fifth, causes the surface
itself to lift as the objective situation changes.
This implies cumulation of a progressive sort.
What brings it to a halt?
DOWNTURN AND REVERSAL
A downturn in price-timed buying occurs
after the amount of positive buying reaches
its peak. This definition parallels the usual
idea of a peak in any economic activity. Note
that even after a downturn, so defined, many
terms might still be moving upward on the
upper right segment of the ownership sur-
face, but aggregate movement in the vertical
direction would have started to decrease. If
price-timed buying is visualized as superim-
posed on an upward phase of final buying, the
downturn in price-timed buying marks the
point at which its impact on total buying
starts to lessen.
But for some purposes the more significant
change in price-timed buying is the point at
which it turns from positive to negative. At
this point the influence of the timing of buy-
ing starts to depress rather than to stimulate
total buying. Call this point reversal, admit-
tedly in this special sense. It will be useful to
note how both downturn and reversal in
price-timed buying occur as a result of ele-
ments internal to the model.
Structural characteristics require that price-
timed buying must turn down soon after par-
ticipation in it has reached its maximum. That
it does reach a maximum is guaranteed by the
hill-shaped form of the proclivity to benefit
and by the ceilings to price-timed ownership.
Structural characteristics do not imply that
reversal must set in; they imply that price..
timed buying cease but not that it turn nega-
tive.
Behavioralcharacteristics, on theother
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versal. Insofar as expectations about rates of
rise in prices determine buying, a downturn
would occur when the rate of rise in
rate of rise ceased accelerating; reversal would
occur when it started to decline. Although,
as previously explained, formulations of this
sort seem totally unrealistic, it is possible that
attention to rates of change becomes more
common when a buying wave has lasted long
enough for assurance about the direction of
change to grow strong. If so, vulnerability to
reversal, as well as to downturn, increases
sharply at that time.
Insofar as the increasing assurance with
which expectations are held constitutesa
major aspect of the developing situation, a
downturn occurs, other things the same, when
the rate at which assurance (more specifically
the action that it motivates) is building up
starts to slacken; reversal occurs when assur-
ance begins to lessen. And it seems likely that
this lessening can take place as a result of the
level of activity alone. At times, for example,
factors directly associated with price increases
of the past will raise doubt about their con-
tinuation in the future. For one thing,if
prices reach levels that are high with respect
to previous levels, this fact can raise doubt
whether they will continue to rise. For an-
other thing, operating margins may narrow
after prices have risen for a while; a tend-
ency of this sort is promoted by the fact that
crude products respond more sensitively to
changes in demand than do finished products.
Narrowing margins often raise doubts whether
prices will continue to rise. Structural and
behavioral characteristics, then, guarantee a
downturn and virtually guarantee a reversal
in price-timed buying.
But in any event market response must, it
would seem, convert downturn into reversal.
The presumption rests on the supposition
that the strength of the reaction of prices,
delivery periods, or other market phenomena
are a function of the amount of price-timed
buying and perhaps also of its rate of change.
Sensitivity to the latter would reflect, among
other things, the difficulties that suppliers ex-
perience in changing production schedules.
But within a wide range of functional rela-
tionships it would necessarily be true that the
amount of market response declines when the
amount of price-timed buying does.Ifso,
the information feedback signals reductions
in rates of price increase and less sureness
that some prices will continue torise.If
expected rates of rise occur, or the assurance
with which the expectation of some thresh-
old rate is held declines, the ownership posi-
tion that is justified is reduced. In effect, en-
terprise commodity units shift toward the front
and left of the ownership surface and negative
price-timed buying effectuates the shift. Mar-
ketresponsestothesereductionsfurther
reinforcethe messagesthat convey doubt
about further rise. Aggregate price-timed buy-
ing turns negative, that is,reversal occurs,
when the amount of negative buying exceeds
that of positive price-timed buying, that is,
when the sum of the vertical distance by
which some enterprise commodity-units drop
on the ownership surface exceeds that by
which others rise.
DECLINE
The negative phase of a buying wave starts
while most price-timed ownership is positive,
but firms are trying to reduce their position
by refraining from buying. Aggregate materi-
als procurement isthereforeless than the
amount required to provide for final demand.
However negative price-timed buying for any
firm cannot be greater than the volume of
orders that would otherwise be placed to meet
final demand.
It seems likely that firms that had previ-
ously engaged in positive buying would try
to unload in unison. Since there is a cost at-
tached to positive price-timed ownership, un-
certainty alone may be sufficient reason to
forgo the possible benefit and engage in nega-
tive buying. Uncertainty may be more con-
tagious in a business community than is the
expectation of either a rise or fall. In terms290 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
of Figure 5, when uncertainty takes hold of
industry opinion, there is a scramble of units
to hop from wherever they are on the right-
hand segment of the surface to somewhere
on the left-hand side. Thus, though the slope
of negative ownership is mild, negative buy-
ing, to effectuate downward shifts in desired
ownership, can be relatively extreme.
The upturn in price-timed buying occurs
as the number of firms, and the amount of
the reductions desired, start to decline. Here,
as for the upward peak, structural assump-
tions imply that the force of negative buying
must decline. Indeed, the minimum hand to
mouth position is doubtless far closer to the
efficient service level of ownership than is the
ceiling level; consequently declines must bot-
tom off sooner.
Reversal, the start of positive buying, is
brought on by the behavioral and market re-
action aspects of the model in a manner gen-
erally parallel to the upper turn. However,
as mentioned at the outset of this section, it
seems likely that support from elements out-
side of the model—elements associated with
final demand and other marked forces—are
essential to launch price-timed buying on a
climb over the positive sector of the owner-
ship surface. However, if the support is pres-
ent, the ground has been prepared for rapid
and cumulating response. The decline of neg-
ative price-timed buying has already reduced
the depressant influence on total buying of
market oriented elements, and firms whose
business has improved unexpectedly will be
caught short and behave accordingly. Their
behavior echoes in a manner previously de-
scribed.
PRICE-TIMED BUYING AND THE INVENTORY CYCLE
A wave in price-timed buying has been de-
scribed in terms of factors capable of produc-
ing self-reversing fluctuations of endogenously
determined duration. It is shaped by the eco-
logical process whereby opinion is formed,
acted upon, diffused through the economy,
and affected by it.
All Market-Oriented Buying
The model has focused on one aspect of
market conditions—prices. Even so, changes
in other aspects which are inevitably associ-
ated with changes in price—delivery period,
assortments, quality—were recognized in dis-
cussions of market response to price-timed
buying.
To admit these influences explicitly as part
of the process embodied in a model would
require, I believe, virtually no change in its
basic structure. Indeed, the surface labeled
price-timed ownership as shown in Figure 5
may well be a more realistic picture of mar-
ket-oriented ownership than of expectation
focused on price alone. The rise in expected
rates of change in prices, measured along the
horizontal axis, might well not actually occur
unless the increase in expected costs repre-
sented by market prices were joined by costs
associated with poorer selections or longer de-
livery terms. Likewise, the rising assurance
diagrammed in the backward dimension could
be caused by combinations of things that are
likely to occur. For example, if, with a given
degree of assurance, prices are expected to
rise and delivery periods are expected to
lengthen, there is far less to be risked by in-
creasing ownership than if either were ex-
pected to occur without the other.
Thisimpliesthatthemodelasde-
scribed could doubtless be applied to the
totality of market prospects without funda-
mental change.
Interindustry Diffusion
The ecology of a wave of market-oriented
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apply across industry lines. How this can and
does occur needs study, but a few guesses may
be in order. For one thing, the industries in
a single vertical sequence are linked in many
ways. Changes in the prices of raw materials
such as cotton, hides, fats and oils, and scrap
metals are known and watched by firms at
later stages of an industry as indicators of
prices and other market conditions in the
more finished lines such as cloth, shoes, short-
ening, autos, cooking ware, and electrical ap-
paratus. From the finished end, the influ-
ence of final demand has a significant bear-
ing on raw materials as well as on finished
goods markets. Between the two ends of a
sequence the similar expectations are pro-
moted by the hourly and daily contacts of
buyer and seller over the telephone, in the
office, and in the market; each firm is both
buyer of materials and seller of a product,
and thus a link in a vertical chain.'4 The link
is specific in connection with unfilled orders.
For a particular company, undelivered sales
orders on the books can, of course, take a
substantial part of the gamble out of price-
timed buying of materials.
The closer are business ties, the more surely
will diffusion occur, and the more promptly.
Consequently, itis not difficult to visualize
how a buying wave can develop within a
single industry sequence. But were expecta-
tions contained within these narrow channels,
waves in various industries could counteract
one another. If so, the quantitative impact
on the economy as a whole would be small
and the multiplier effects would be virtually
nonexistent. Of great interest, therefore, are
the factors capable of diffusing a disturbance
across industry lines.
One can only guess what these are, since
the subject has not been studied. The hints
14Examplesof linkages ofthese sorts appear in
Thomas M. Stanbeck, Jr., "Short-Run Instability in the
Cotton Broad Woven Goods Industry, 1946—1951," Un-
published Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1954;
and Ruth P. Mack, Consumption and Business Fluc-
tuations; A Case Study of the Shoe, Leather, Hide Se-
quence, Princeton for NBER, 1956.
of parallelism that we have observed in mar-
kets so diverse as department store merchan-
dising and durable goods manufacturing whet
the curiosity to know more. One obvious car-
rier of diffusion is the level of final demand
and its rate of change, since most commodities
share in some degree the fortunes of the econ-
omy as a whole. Another candidate isthe
price of sensitive commodities not subject to
strong independent variations in supply; for
such commodities parallel price movements
often occur. Here again, prices are one aspect
of a more complicated set of market condi-
tions, the influence of which spreads. It may
also be that prices and market conditions in
some commodities (steel is a good example)
have a pervasive influence on a wide variety
of other raw metals and finished goods. Other
common influences—credit conditions, labor
conditions,specialsituations of broad im-
portance(nationalandinternational)—are
likewise capable of some across the board in-
fluence on market expectations.
The Pieces of an Inventory Model
Fluctuation in ownership associated with
changing market prospects, in which ecolog-
ical interplay is of special importance, is of
course only one part of the total process of
fluctuation in stocks on hand and on order.
Consequently the model of price-timed buy-
ing is only one piece of a complete model of
fluctuation in materials inventories. Its par-
ticular function is to explain why even this
most volatile set of influences does not imply
a sawtooth pattern of fluctuation but instead
tends to cause inventories to build up more
slowly and necessarily to retard and reverse.
Other aspects of an inventory model were
discussed in Chapter 11, where differences were
indicated in the picture appropriate to de-
partment stores and to durable goods man-
ufacturers. The multiplier aspects associated
with income and with expectations and their
interrelationship were mentioned in Chapter
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together largely as a sequence of empty boxes
for which the previous discussions, especially
the models of Chapter 11, serve to illustrate
how they may be filled for various industries
or other sufficiently homogeneous segments
of the economy. A model for aggregate fluctu-
ation in materials inventories would probably
have to be built up by appropriate weighting
of the segments.
The major pieces that need to be described
and articulated are:
1. A forecasting procedure forming the
basis of initial buying, which recognizes the
information typically available to manage-
ment and the time periods for which fore-
casts are actually required. This implies a
basic distinction between firms having little
advance knowledge of short-term changes in
sales other than of a seasonal sort, such as
retail stores, and firms for which sales orders
or other trustworthy barometers provide a
basis for reasonably good forecasts, such as
many durable goods manufacturers. It also
implies recognizing patterns of buying in
terms of the overlapping time periods that the
shingled structure of procurement frequently
implies.'5
2. A link of desired stocks to expected sales
which for cyclical analysis is best formulated
in incremental rather than average terms. My
emphasis is negative—a constant average re-
lationship ought not to be assumed. Even a
constant incremental relation is of course a
roughapproximation,butperhapsclose
enough to realistic requirements to serve; pre-
sumably coefficients for increments would typ-
ically be smaller than the average ratio.
3. Changing opportunity costs of invento-
ries which recognize changes in costs of carry-
ing stocks, on the one hand (e.g., those associ-
ated with the presence of back orders or
changes in the availability or cost of funds),
isSeethe discussion of department store orders and
manufacturers' orders and shipments in Chapter 11.
Note in connection with the latter that orders can
provide a forecasting instrument even when goods are
not made to order.
and, on the other hand, of alternative ways
of performing the functions that stocks serve
(e.g., flexible employment or selling policies).
4. The influence of changes in market pros-
pects and expectations concerning them on
the timing of buying. This covers influences
originating primarily from the supply as well
as the demand side and their ecological inter-
play.
5. Methods of defining, recognizing, and
correcting error; this is a complex element.
It involves in the first place the relative im-
portance of inventory goals in the framework
of all management problems—the opportunity
costs of management attention to defining and
enforcing precise inventory goals. It involves
correction in the second instance for faulty
initial guesses about future requirements; the
shingled pattern of buying mentioned in para-
graph 1 has relevance here. It involves cor-
rectionof procurement based on expecta-
tions concerning market conditions or other
matters which are found to have been in error
or which no longer apply.
6. An income and expectation multiplier.
At any particular time net capital investment
in inventories is subject to some sort of in-
come multiplier at an aggregate level. But
its effect can be muted or amplified depend-
ing on the interpretation placed on the change
in inventories on hand and on order and the
expectations thereby aroused?8
If the model isconstructed in terms of
ownership,all of the prescriptions can be
viewed as applying roughly to the present
in the sense for which the objectives and
realistic judgments call. This makes it pos-
sible to net out some of the anticipations-
correction procedures, such as those implied
in the shingled orders (paragraph1)and
corrections (paragraph 5). The income mul-
tiplier in paragraph 6 operates with the lag
16Multipliersare a central point inthe analysis
that closes Chapter 12. Other specifics on this point
appear at many places in the book, but particu-
larly the discussion of Exhibit 2, Cases I and II in
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implied by successive income receipt and
spending sequences. The expectation multi-
plier in paragraph 6 operates with such lags
as the ecological process implies. The latter
statement applies in some degree to the cx-
pectational elements in any of the paragraphs,
but particularly to paragraph 4.
If the model is constructed in terms of
materials stock on hand, itis necessary al-
ways toallow for thetime required for
orders to enter stock and thecorrections
that have been put into effect during that
time. Even the allowance for deliveries is dif-
ficult to make in view of the long and chang-
ing leads of outstandings relative to stocks.17
The implications seem to be that the model
loses most of its potential analytic value if
applied to stock on hand. But it would be
useful in gauging the gross influences on
stocks of previous levels of outstandings. For
example, in 1961 and 1962, when these levels
were low, stocks would presumably tend not
to be as high relative to activity as at other
comparablecyclicalstages— 1950,1954—55,
1958—59.
The importance that I assign to expecta-
tions and to the information conveyed by
orders rules out period analysis of the Lund-
berg-Metzler variety. Response in terms of
ownershipisvisualizedaspotentiallyim-
mediate,whereasthesituationtowhich
buying responds evolves over time periods
inherent to each particular sort of situation
or process.
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
I mentioned at the close of Chapter 3 that
the strategy of scientific advance often means
that a good question answered badly may be
a necessary prelude to a good answer some
years later. The purpose of this book has
been primarily to test the value of a question
—How do flows of information, commands, ex-
pectations, contribute to the understanding
of flows of goods and income? The broad
question has sired a family of specific ques-
tions discussed at the close of Chapters 11
and 12. They are implicitly collected in a
series of related boxes by the model that has
just been outlined. Fill in the answers and
the theory achieves a concrete form. At any
rate, understanding grows. Work toward this
end can, happily, utilize the great deal that
has already been done. But it may be useful
to discuss, without pretense of system, some of
the work that needs doing.
Time Series. The most obvious need is for
time series that reveal patterns of communica-
tion in the form of orders along with in-
formation about actions such as shipments
17 See the discussion and illustrative example in
Chapter 10.
or production. Required are data for the
same firms on sales orders and purchase or-
ders, shipments and receipts, and, if possible,
flows at other critical points such as produc-
tion starts or finished production. Informa-
tion for the stock pools that these flows bound
completes the statistical picture. By arranging
the firms (or divisions of them) in vertically
related sequences,it would be possibleto
tracethe vertical transmissionof demand
through the economy. Such sequences could
also be related to appropriate price informa-
tion. Information for stages of an industry
sequence would provide the wherewithal for
examining how buying waves spread verti-
cally. Information for groups of industries
would provide insight concerning the lateral
dissemination of fluctuation.
The report of the Consultant Committee
on Inventory Statistics, made to the Subcom-
mittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint
Committee on the Economic Report in 1955,
stressed the importance of information of this
sort.It recommended improvement inthe
data for manufacturing stocks, shipments, and
orders(Recommendation10);itrecom-294 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
mended that information on sales, new or-
ders, stocks, and outstanding orders for major
departments of department stores be collected
(Recommendation 21). There has been a
carefuloverhaulingofthe manufacturing
data, but unfortunately the information is
still less than what is needed to picture the
flow of orders and output on a vertical or
horizontal basis. For department stores the
situation is sad indeed. Far from providing
statistics on orders by departments, even the
data for the total stores has been discontinued
as of December 1963.
The capacity of time series to inform about
vertical and horizontal communicationof
fluctuation would be greatly enhanced if data
for individual firms were summarized in terms
of distributions as well as in terms of the
usual totals or averages. Certainly, •for ex-
ample, it would be useful to know something
of the patterns of change in the distribution
of firms in an industry with respect to the
number of weeks' supply of materials held
on hand and on order, and of rates of change
in this supply.
Interviews. Statistical data of these sorts,
data capable of indicating what is done with
respect to purchasing and inventory prob-
lems, require the counterpoint of informa-
tion bearing on why it is done. One way of
acquiring this sort of insight is to ask the
businessmen who make the decisions. I realize
that the results of discussions are considered
unscientific and subjective. Resorting to this
method involves a trade-off: relevance is em-
phasized at the sacrifice of precision. But at
the present state of the art, it seems clear that
relevanceisoften a bargain purchase. In
short, "It is better to be vaguely right than
precisely wrong." 18Specifically,systematic dis-
cussions with businessmen are required con-
cerning the range of subjects covered in Chap-
ter 2. We need to get richer and firmer knowl-
18Theremark was attributed to Wildon Carr by
G. S. Shove, in "The Place of Marshall's Principles in
the Development of Economic Theory," Economic
Journal, December 1942, p. 323.
edge about the structure of costs and op-
portunity costs bearing on stocks and pur-
chasing. We need to understand the informa-
tion systems that help to formulate and vali-
date objectives. Questionnaires are, of course,
entirely useless for this purpose, at least until
far more is learned about what to ask and
how to formulate questions. Indeed, even in
an open-ended interview, specific questions
about stocks are likely at best to be only a
point of departure.
For example, if a department store execu-
tive is asked whether, when sales increase 5
per cent, stocks also need to increase in the
same proportion, the answer may be some-
thing like this: When sales first increase 5 or
even 10 per cent, stocks need not increase
at all. But pretty soon, often in connection
with the next periodic planning procedures,
management will start to think that the high
level is going to last. Then stocks will move
up to their customary ratio to sales. But the
question, "Why do stocks need to rise that
much?" provokes answers which do not, to
the businessman, seem to hold their ground
when probed. The investigations that need
to be made consist of the discussions that
follow, in which the man of affairs who knows
the stuff of which good decisions are made
is provoked to explore the grammar of the
prose he speaks so well.
Discussions are exceedingly flexibletech-
niques of study and accordingly are sensitive
to the preoccupations of the investigator. If
interviews are to be fully useful, they must
probe the subjective as well as objective fac-
tors that determine how information isse-
lected, appreciated, and acted upon. Of spe-
cial importance in the context of the ecologi-
cal aspectsis the role of learning and as-
surance.Isthere evidence of the gradual
buildup that the ecological model assumes?
If so, what information is watched, how does
action depend on the perception of what
competitors, suppliers, or customers are doing
or have done? How is such knowledge con-
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tries? Also of particular importance to the
model are insights that can provide a basis
for estimating how proclivity distributions are
shaped. Interviews and other sorts of informa-
tion, then, can in effect help to redraw Figure
5 and to suggest how units move from one
spot on the surface to another. The answers
would doubtless be found to differ for various
sorts of industries.
Econometrics. As indicated toward the be-
ginning of Chapter 9, econometrics was tabled
for the course of this investigation. One would
hope that its talents could be enlisted to test
some of the notions that have been put for-
ward and to add quantitative dimensions.
As mentioned earlier, both the investigations
described in this book and further informa-
tion of the sorts just mentioned are prerequi-
sites. But even so, formidable difficulties per-
sist in incorporating the insights of this study
into equations.
The study has shown that an understanding
of the behavior of aggregate stocks must be
built up out of an understanding of a num-
ber of parts for which causality is reasonably
homogeneous. The analysis throws some light
on how the parts should be defined. But even
so there are major hurdles to be leaped or
circumvented.
A convincing statistical "explanation" of
the behavior of stocks or ownership must
reconcile the observed magnitude and timing
of aggregate fluctuations with a realistic view
of business operations. My findings have pre-
sented the hypothesis that efficient servicing
of sales,other things the same, does not
require fluctuations as large as those which
the statistics show and consequently "other
things" do in fact appear to change with
business conditions. Econometric analysis is
thus asked to identify these other things and
measure their impact.19
19Needlessto say, the effort to identify influences on
stocks other than that of salesis familiar to econ-
ometric analysis. But, as I pointed out in Chapter 1,
the results seem to be less than satisfactory. A major
difficulty is the too powerful influence of orders. If
ownership rather than stock is to be explained, the
At a statistical level, this underscores the
usual difficultiesof isolating factors which
tend to parallel one another at least most of
thetime—factors suchasshipments,sales
orders, labor costs, capacity utilization, market
stringency, opportunity costs of financing or
expectations about each.
At an analytic level, the potentially im-
mediate response of ownership implies that
distributed lags are a receptacle for ignorance;
even for stocks, lags must have a duration that
makes sense in terms of specific management
problems and procedures in the context of
cyclical variation.20 Finally,the interpreta-
tion of the meaning of coefficients is confused
by the possibility of multidirectional causal
relationships, including those of an ecological
sort.21
With the help of information from inter-
view studies,the ingenuity of econometric
work may contrive to circumvent the worst of
these difficulties. If so,it seems likely that
difficulty can be described by saying that new sales
orders (or backlogs) may be viewed as a cause and
new purchase orders (or outstandings) are a result.
The format of the analysis must somehow accommodate
this distinction.
20Inthe Context of seasonal variation, the lags would
often be different, and this raises questions concerning
the usefulness of analyses based on data that are not
deseasonalized when seasonal patterns are strong. For
example, unlike cyclical variations, seasonals in sales
can often be quite reliably forecast; the relative im-
portance of the several explanatory variables usually
differs for cyclical and seasonal changes in stocks and
ownership;the timing of the relations among the
variables will differ. If seasonals are strong, the parain-
eters of the equation system may tend to recite the
seasonal rather than cyclical version of the story.
21Thesequalificationsofthe meaningfulnessof
gross correlation measures are superimposed on the
worries expressed in Chapter 9, note 2, above. Indeed,
perhaps the only honest test for association of these
sorts abjures the comfort of the "one period change
model" and endeavors to reproduce history by means
of an equation system for a "process model"—one in
which the influences presumed to be at work are fully
specified and asked to churn out the resultant course
of the dependent variable. (For an instructive com-
parison of the results of the two sorts of models, see
Kalman J.Cohen, Computer Models ofthe Shoe,
Leather, Hide Sequence, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960.)
Simulation may be a simpler and more flexible way to
achieve a similar result.296 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
individually fragile findings may gain collec-
tive strength by a comparison of the findings
for a number of individual industries or
departments of department stores. The co-
efficients developed for the several business
situations ought to differ in fashions that
seem sensible in the light of other knowledge
about each situation.
Simulation. Finally, there are serious gaps
of knowledge concerning how the individual's
view of the problem, the information that
he uses, the responses that he makes, are in-
fluenced by the market and how it responds to
and generates new information. Processes in-
volving information have been studied under
the titles of cybernetics and information the-
ory. The particular sorts of processes involved
in the model of price-timed buying could
be explored with the aid of the massive ca-
pacity of the computer to manipulate and
memorize numbers. The technique of simu-
lation is suitable and flexible. It has been re-
peatedly put to work on the problem of trac-
ing, in accordance with stochastic principle,
how individual behavior builds into a time
course of aggregate behavior.22
But my study seems to call for something
more than the now familiar notion of analysis
with a "feedback" from the environment. The
character of the feedback is critical: it is one
for which the coefficients of reaction (at the
individual as well as at the aggregate level)
themselves change. As farasI know, the
22 Seeespecially Guy Orcutt, "A New Type of
SocioeconomicSystem," Reviewof Economics and
Statistics, May 1957, pp. 116—123, and subsequent work
of Orcutt and other contributors to the work of the
SocialSystemsResearchInstitute,Universityof
Wisconsin.
Needless to say, feedbacks can be represented in
mathematical modelsalso. James Duesenberry and
Franco Modigliani took this approach in their models
of consumer buying which introduced maximum past
levels of income as an indication of changing stand-
ards of living. The advantage of simulation, as I see it,
is simply, first, that a theory that proposes reactions
of people to one another is put to a sharper test if
the process is specified at the individual level. Second,
the process is likely to imply response at an aggregate
level which is nonlinear, and therefore likely to be lost
if functional forms must be predetermined.
aggregate implications of this sort of process
have not been explored. Interestingly enough,
the closest thing to it that has come to my
attentionisin the field of epidemiology—
the Reed-Frost model.23
One of the most attractive aspects of the
technique of simulation is its capacity to test
a theory constructed in terms of selected char-
acteristics and behavior of individuals. The
assumptions that are made must result in a
spaced and self-reversing wave; of critical in-
terest is the ten- to fifteen-month thrust. Simu-
lation itself can indicate what values for chief
components of the model will, and what will
not, produce movements of the sort posited. It
can indicate the support that is required from
exogenous influences.It can indicate how
sensitive the picture is to reasonable ranges
of variation in critical pieces of the explana.
tion.24
I have suggested a number of directions
in which the effort to deepen understanding
of the vertical diffusion of fluctuation associ-
ated with inventory waves may be pursued.
They feature the effort to understand the
behavior of individuals and how it generates
23 Work inthe field of mathematical analysis of
epidemics started in the first decade of the century,
when it was found that periodic recurrences of epi-
demics could be deduced from and described by
information on the number of susceptibles, contact-
rates, attack-rates, and recovery ratios. Theory devel-
oped over many years. However, deterministic models
did not seem to square with the facts, and a stochastic
model was introduced in the middle of the 1920's.
Somewhat later, the notion of a threshold was intro-
duced; the proportion of susceptibles in a community
must be above some critical value.
The approach seems to be associated with the name
of Lowell J. Reed and Wade Hampton Frost, who
taught at Johns Hopkins University. But most of the
written expositions and much ifnot most of the
theoretical and empirical work appears to have been
done by others. See Norman T. Bailey, Mathematical
Epidemiology, London, 1957. There are also numerous
articles in the journal, Human Biology, A Record of
Research, September 1952, and in Jerzy Neyman, ed.,
The Third Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical
Statistics and Probability.
24 James Bettman intends to explore some of these
questions through interviews and perhaps simulation
in his doctoral dissertation at Yale University, Graduate
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and feeds upon relevant information and
changing objective situations. Knowledge of
this sort seems to me to be necessary to sci-
entific exploration of the process of economic
change.
But itis perhaps not too visionaryto
hope that it may have some value in modify-
ing the process. Most businessmen probably
prefer to buy and sell in a relatively stable
and predictable market. If so, fluctuations of
the sort that have been discussed are un-
desirable. Understanding of how fluctuation
is built up by the system whereby problems
areperceived and solved by businessmen
could be a first step in designing better ways
of solving them—ways that subdue their in-
nate tendency to generate and amplify fluctu-
ation. Insights would bear particularly, I sus-
pect, on the problem of sustaining business
expansion.
If itis useful to trace the move-by-move
pattern whereby expectations, actions, infor-
mation, and situations feed upon one another
in connection with the buying of materials
by business enterprises, it should be useful
also to trace analogous processes in other
fields. Certainly, for example, the "fickleness"
of consumers, or the lumped equipment pur-
chasing of producers, or local "construction
cycles" are not without strong elements of
interplay among the actions of many indi-
viduals as well as between individuals and
the business environment. Some elements of
the price-timed buying model might be ex-
pected to apply—the hill-shaped frequency
distributions of proclivities, the ceilings, the
importance of assurance and learning, the
time-consuming buildupofevidence,the
changing patterns of market response. But
many other elements would differ, particularly
the length of most of the lags. Even trend
growth, especiallyin developing countries,
shares most of these elements.
Questions of these sorts, once raised, are
hard to forget. Their hold is strengthened
by the importance that we are learning to
accord to rates of change in the economy—
rates of rise during prosperity fast enough
to maintain expansion but not too fast to
be themselves maintained. Rates of change in
ecological processes tend to be willful at the
aggregate level. Hope of adjusting them to
the requirements of stable growth seems to
lie in understanding the underlying micro-
process and how it cumulates. For this pur-
pose the august tools of equilibrium analysis
may be of limited use.